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When a question is raised concerning the morality of any social
institution, one tends to assume that the issue is whether, or to what
extent, the institution measures up to moral standards. It is thus
one would understand a reference to the morality of betting on
horses, or of prostitution. Professor Fuller's title, however, is not
to be construed in that manner. Rather it is as if the author had
set out to compose a handbook of recommended procedures for
bookmakers or prostitutes. For the thesis of his book is that law as
a social institution, or rather as a human enterprise, has become
associated with a special set of standards which he calls the "internal
morality" of law. These standards generally govern the procedural
as opposed to the substantive side of law, and Professor Fuller considers them under eight heads: law should be general, promulgated,
clear and free from contradiction, constant through time, and congruent with the acts of officials; law should not be retroactive, or
require the impossible. His long second chapter contains a careful
discussion of each of these principles, with special emphasis on the
many ways in which they must be limited and qualified.
These limitations and qualifications relate to the first of two
major points articulated by Professor Fuller in evaluating the internal morality of law: namely, that it is a morality of aspiration, not of
duty. The distinction between these two kinds of morality is very
important for ethical theory in general, though much too frequently
overlooked by writers in that field, and Professor Fuller devotes a
very successful first chapter to its elucidation. Like the law, a
morality of duty requires that people avoid certain forms of unacceptable behavior, and threatens punishment or disapproval when
they don't. A morality of aspiration, on the other hand, challenges
people to pursue various kinds of excellence by establishing ideals.
In applying this general distinction to the inner morality of law,
Professor Fuller argues convincingly that the principles he had
discussed serve to define an ideal of legality to which a legal system
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may aspire, but cannot serve as rules rigidly controlling the acts of
lawmakers.
The author's second assertion regarding the inner morality of law
is even more important, and represents the central theme of the
book. He contends that this morality is a kind of natural law; it
lies, so to speak, in the nature of things since it flows from the very
definition of law. This definition, which Professor Fuller defends at
some length, is that law is "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules." 2 The inner morality of law flows
from this definition since no enterprise of this kind can possibly
succeed unless the principles of that morality are observed, human
nature and the facts of life being what they are.
Professor Fuller frequently analogizes the law and the practical
arts, such as carpentry, and perhaps the point may be made in these
instrumental terms. The law is a tool useful for many purposes.
The inner morality of law is nothing more than the rules for the
use of this tool, rules justified by the fact that if they are flouted the
purposes for which the tool is designed cannot be achieved, and the
tool itself will be damaged or destroyed. Once it has been settled
how to use this tool, the question of what to do with it is a matter
for the external morality of law.
So far, so good. Rules of this kind for the use of a tool no doubt
do deserve the name of natural law, for they are justified by objective
facts about the way the world operates. But it must always be remembered-and perhaps this is the point that Professor Fuller's
positivistic opponents would wish most particularly to emphasizethat such rules can only give rise to a morality of hypothetical imperatives in the Kantian sense. They have nothing to say to the man
who wants precisely those results that misuse of the tool will produce. Misuse of the instrument of the law may yield the abjectly
submissive and terrorized citizenry that the tyrant desires.
Perhaps at this point Professor Fuller would object that law so
misused is equivalent to an absence of law. Thus, he urges that the
abuses of the Nazi regime produced not bad law, but no law at all,
and he employs this observation to support his definition of law.
But this is like saying that a hairpin used to pick a lock is not a
hairpin but a key. While perhaps this may be an arguable recommendation for the use of words, no substantial point of theory
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should turn on a semantic distinction. However, the author clearly
demonstrates that such verbal distinctions may have practical significance, as in dealing with the problem of what to do with the man
who has used the "law" of a Nazi-like regime for his own ends.
The book is an expanded version of the author's Storrs lectures
on jurisprudence given at the Yale Law School in 1963, and this no
doubt accounts for the pleasantly informal, yet lucid style in which
the book is written. Professor Fuller is not one to define his topic
with a pedantic narrowness, and this review cannot do justice to the
many interesting results which the author achieves during his discussion of the ramifications and applications of his argument. It is
a good book, whatever judgment must finally be made about the
cogency of its arguments, and this reviewer's predominant feeling
upon finishing it was one of regret that so fascinating a subject as
philosophy of law has not been kept in the philosophy departments
on an equal footing with philosophy of science.
ROBERT BINKLEY*

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA.

By

Norman Adrian Wiggins.' Atlanta: The Harrison Company,
1965. Two Vols., Pp. 1418.
Professor Wiggins has fulfilled a need of the legal profession, the
court, the estate planner, trust officer, executor, administrator, and
guardian in the publication of Wills and Administration of Estates
in North Carolina. Although his subject does not lend itself to the
writing style of an Ellery Queen, Professor Wiggins' concise and
comprehensive presentation evidences his qualifications as an author
in this field. As a bank trust officer, he received practical experience
in those matters of which he writes. As a member of the faculty of
the School of Law of Wake Forest College, he teaches courses in
Wills, Estate Planning and Taxation. He served on a committee of
the North Carolina General Statutes Commission to draft recom-mended legislation for the revision and improvement of the probate
laws of the state. Because of his work on this Commission, Professor Wiggins' discussion of the Intestate Succession Act of 1959
will be especially helpful to North Carolina lawyers. Indeed, his
treatment of the act constitutes a highlight of this work.
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